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OPERATION DEEP WATER

WE SEE YOU, 2026

Deep Water — Russian submarines over the North Sea's cables and pipelines

START	DURATION	TASK GROUP	ROE
12 NOV 2026 · 1800Z	48 HOURS	CTG 327.4 · ST ALBANS	WEAPONS TIGHT

TITLE PLATE — SHETLAND, THE THREE CORRIDORS AND YANTAR, 12 NOV 2026. SATELLITE IMAGERY: NASA EOSDIS WORLDVIEW (MODIS/VIIRS TRUE COLOUR), RENDERED MONOCHROME; CORRIDORS AND POSITIONS DRAWN OVER IT.

OPORD 26-052 · ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) · SERIAL 04

We See You, 2026

Deep Water · Operation DEEP WATER · 12–14 November 2026

Originator
UKMCC Northwood, intelligence cell, on behalf of the UK and Norwegian Chiefs of Defence

Fusion support
NJHQ Reitan · CTF 311 · NMIC · Gassco

For
CTG 327.4, embarked HMS ST ALBANS

As of
12 NOV 26, 1800Z

Order
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Campaign
Europe 2026 · scenario 4

CONTENTS

1 Situation
2 What intelligence believes
3 Area and geography
4 Forces
5 Constraints
6 What London expects, and how to play it
7 Special actions guide
8 The governments and the press
9 Provenance
10 Glossary

The Russian research ship *Yantar* is loitering east of Shetland again, outside British waters, at four knots. An Akula came south-west through the Norwegian Sea yesterday, and Northwood believes that a GUGI carrier submarine has sailed from Olenya Guba with her deep-diving submersible. Under this sea run the cable that links the Faroes to Britain and the pipelines that bring Norwegian gas ashore. London and Oslo want the submarines found, held and caught at work, and then they want to tell Moscow so, in public. Nobody fires a shot. The nights are long, a gale is coming, and the patrol aircraft have only so many hours.

THE SCENARIO, FOR THE PLAYER RATHER THAN THE COMMANDER

COMPLEXITY

4/5

Classic Command: you build your own anti-submarine missions from scratch. Two special actions, a political layer, a gale. No shooting war.

DIFFICULTY

5/5

Three corridors, quiet targets, one very quiet. The target and the Russian task are not the same from one game to the next, and the Russians notice being watched.

DURATION

48 h

1800Z on 12 November to 1800Z on the 14th: two long nights. Five to seven hours of play at compressed time.

1 Situation

1.1 The research ship is back

For the past few days the oceanographic research ship *Yantar* has been working slowly south through the waters east of Shetland, in international waters, with her AIS on. She belongs to GUGI, the Russian Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research: the organisation that maps the seabed and the cables and pipelines that lie on it, and that runs Russia's deep-diving submarines. She is not a warship and she breaks no law by being here. She is also never here by chance.

Yesterday the Norwegian seabed arrays tracked an Akula-class attack submarine heading south-west through the Norwegian Sea. And Northwood believes, on intelligence it does not share in this pack, that a GUGI carrier submarine has sailed from Olenya Guba with her submersible under her hull. A research ship on the surface, an attack submarine, and a carrier with a submersible: that is the group seen this spring over critical infrastructure in the North Atlantic.

1.2 Why London and Oslo are worried

Three lines cross this sea, and the group could be after any one of them. West of Shetland, in the deep water of the Faroe–Shetland Channel, the **SHEFA-2** cable carries the Faroes' and Shetland's data to Scotland. East of Shetland the **FLAGS** and **Vesterled** gas lines run from the Brent and Heimdal fields to St Fergus. Off Norway, over the Norwegian Trench, the **Langeled** pipeline carries a large share of Britain's imported gas. Each of them can be surveyed, listened to, or prepared for cutting, and the damage is only ever discovered afterwards.

In December 2025 Britain and Norway agreed to patrol these waters together. Operation DEEP WATER is that agreement at work, and Task Group 327.4 is its tool: British and Norwegian ships and aircraft under one commander. That commander is you, from 1800Z today.

> ON THE PUBLIC RECORD, AND IN THIS EXERCISE
>
> **Real (public sources):** in November 2025 *Yantar* spent days north of Scotland and towards the Faroes; lasers were aimed at the pilots of an RAF P-8 that watched her, and GPS was jammed around HMS *Somerset*, which shadowed her for eight days. In March and April 2026 an Akula and two GUGI submarines, with *Yantar*, spent more than a month over critical infrastructure in the North Atlantic, met by RAF and Norwegian P-8s, Merlins, HMS *St Albans*, RFA *Tidespring* and a Norwegian frigate. On 9 April the Defence Secretary said so in public: "we see your activity over our cables and our pipelines".
>
> **This exercise:** the group comes back in November. Everything that follows from here on (the intelligence, the events, the messages, and what the Russians are really doing) is invented for the game. Section 9 separates the two in detail.

1.3 This evening

At 1800Z *Yantar* is about seventy-five miles north-east of Lerwick, at the reference point **YANTAR LAST POSITION**, heading south-south-west at four knots. **HMS St Albans**, the flagship, is east of Shetland with her towed array and MERLIN 21 on deck. **HMS Anson**, an Astute-class submarine, is on patrol north-west of Shetland. **HNoMS Thor Heyerdahl** is off the Norwegian coast, and **RFA Tidespring** is south of Shetland. The RAF P-8 crews HUNTER 1 and 2 are at Lossiemouth, the Norwegian crews NORNE 1 and 2 at Evenes, far to the north.

The sun set at 1540Z and does not rise again until 0746Z. The moon is a thin crescent that has already gone down: the first night is long and dark. No Russian submarine is held on our picture.

If you come to this sequence from the Baltic, Ushant and Sardinia, the autumn follows you: the mood at home and among the allies, the posture of the Russian fleet, what NATO can still spare

and what our acoustic library recorded carry over, and the opening message says what has changed.

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2 What intelligence believes

Northwood's analysts agree on what the group is. They do not know where it will work, nor what it has come to do. None of this pack favours an answer, and none should: **the target and the Russian task are not the same from one game to the next**. There is **one task in each game**, on one corridor.

2.1 The group

— **An Akula.** A nuclear attack submarine, quick and capable. For the moment she makes no real effort to stay quiet. An Akula that wants to be heard may be there to draw our aircraft and our submarine; she may stay close to the group to screen it, or go looking for HMS *Anson*.

— **A GUGI carrier submarine.** A Delta IV Stretch conversion of the BS-64 *Podmoskovye* class: a large, old hull rebuilt to carry a deep-diving submersible under her. Large, but quiet when she goes slowly, and she does go slowly.

— **Her deep-diving submersible.** Small, nuclear-powered, built to work on the seabed far deeper than any diver. She leaves the carrier to work and comes back to her to rest. She is very quiet: of all three, the one that is hardest to hear, and the only one that actually touches the line.

— ***Yantar*.** The research ship on the surface: survey sonars, remotely operated vehicles, communications with the submarines below. Where she slows down and stops matters. It is a clue, not a proof.

2.2 What they may have come to do

The analysts keep three tasks open, each with what it would look like below the surface.

— **A survey.** Mapping the line and the seabed round it, for later. *What it would look like:* the submersible moving slowly along the line, point after point.

— **Planting a listening node.** A sensor laid next to a cable or a pipeline, to stay there. *What it would look like:* a long stop at one point of the line.

— **Rehearsing a sabotage.** Charges placed on the line and recovered again, as near Svalbard this spring. *What it would look like:* short stops at several points along the line, one after another.

Whatever the task, the pattern is the same from above: the carrier comes in from deep water and stands off, a few miles from the line; the submersible leaves her, works, and returns; and the group leaves when the job is done, or when it decides it has been seen.

2.3 How the intelligence reaches you

Reports come as messages from the sensor or agency that made them: the seabed arrays, the Norwegian arrays, the Coastguard watching AIS, the operators of the lines. Each carries a NATO grade for the reliability of the source and the credibility of the information. A report may be

wrong, and some will be: a fishing boat's trawl gear on a pipeline sounds much like a machine. A sensor that heard nothing is information too.

Northwood's analysts can tell you where the investigation stands (section 7): for each of the three corridors, **NO INDICATION**, **WEAK**, **MODERATE** or **STRONG**. They never say which one is true. A WEAK can rest on a lead that later proves false; MODERATE and STRONG take observations that have held up.

GRADES

A1–B2 Reliable or usually reliable source, confirmed or probably true. Act on it, but not alone if you can help it.

C3 Fairly reliable source, possibly true. A lead worth an aircraft.

C4–D4 Doubtful. Note it, and look for a second source.

E5–F6 Unreliable, improbable, or cannot be judged. Do not build on it.

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3 Area and geography


3.1 The Faroe–Shetland Channel and the northern North Sea

The operation covers the sea from the Faroe–Shetland Channel in the west to the Norwegian coast in the east, roughly 59° to 63°N, with Shetland in the middle. West of Shetland the channel is deep, over a thousand metres in places, and cold water layers make the sound do strange things: a good place to hide a submarine. East of Shetland the North Sea is shallow, a hundred to a hundred and fifty metres, crowded with oil and gas fields and their supply ships. Off Norway the seabed drops again into the Norwegian Trench, three hundred metres and more.

The traffic never stops. Offshore supply vessels run between the fields and Shetland on AIS; tankers and bulk carriers cross from Norway to Britain; fishing boats work all three areas and many of them do not transmit at all. Every one of them makes noise on a sonar.

The P-8 bases are far apart. **Lossiemouth**, on the Moray Firth, is about forty-five minutes' flying from the area. **Evenes**, in northern Norway, is about two hours each way.

FIGURE 1 — THE AREA: THREE CORRIDORS, THE RESEARCH SHIP AND OUR FORCES AT 1800Z



The reference points are those on your map in the game, numbered 1 to 3 along each corridor. The lines beyond them are drawn for orientation only. YANTAR LAST POSITION is where she was at the start; the reference point does not follow her.

3.2 The three corridors

— **SHEFA-2.** The data cable from the Faroes to Shetland and on to Scotland, the islands' main link to the world. On the map: **SHEFA-2 1**, **SHEFA-2 2** and **SHEFA-2 3**, from the deep channel towards Shetland, and the reference point FAROE-SHETLAND CHANNEL to the north.

— **FLAGS and Vesterled.** Two gas lines that run side by side from the Brent and Heimdal area to the terminal at St Fergus. On the map: **FLAGS 1**, **FLAGS 2** and **FLAGS 3**, east of Shetland. *Yantar* is close to them this evening.

— **Langeled.** The pipeline from Nyhamna in Norway through Sleipner to Easington, one of the longest under any sea and a large share of Britain's gas imports. On the map: **LANGELED 1**, **LANGELED 2** and **LANGELED 3**, over the Norwegian Trench. Oslo watches it closely, and so do the markets.

The operators of the lines watch their own systems and will report what they detect, but a cable or a pipeline is protected by being watched, not by being guarded.


3.3 Light, weather and the clock

All times are ZULU. Britain is on UTC in November; Norway is one hour ahead.

AT 60°30'N 0°30'E	12 NOVEMBER	13 NOVEMBER	14 NOVEMBER
Nautical dawn	—	0612Z	0614Z
Sunrise	—	0746Z	0748Z
Sunset	1540Z	1538Z	1536Z
Nautical dusk	1713Z	1712Z	—
Moon	Thin crescent, sets 1548Z	Sets about 1702Z	Sets about 1831Z

Two nights of about sixteen hours each, with no moon to speak of, and short grey days between them. The weather starts moderate: a fresh breeze and a moderate sea. It will not last. The Met Office will issue a shipping forecast for Fair Isle, Faeroes and Viking during the first night: a **north-westerly severe gale** for the second day, with an expected onset and its margin, lasting most of a day. At the height of it MERLIN 21 cannot work from the deck, and the sea noise blinds sonobuoys and hull sonars. A towed array towed slowly still hears.

FIGURE 2 — THE FORTY-EIGHT HOURS



Two long nights and the short days between them. The first night belongs to the search and to London's first question; the second day to the gale; the second night to whatever has not yet been settled.

4 Forces

4.1 Task Group 327.4, 1800Z

British and Norwegian units are on one side in the game, under your command.

UNIT	TYPE	WHERE	REMARKS
HMS St Albans (F 83)	Type 23 frigate, ASW	East of Shetland, heading east, 10 kt	Flagship. Sonar 2087 towed array. MERLIN 21 on deck
MERLIN 21	Merlin HM.2	On *St Albans*	Dipping sonar, sonobuoys, Stingray (held). The only helicopter
HMS Anson (S 123)	Astute-class SSN	North-west of Shetland, 5 kt, 80 m	The best ears we have. Slow to reposition quietly
HNoMS Thor Heyerdahl (F 314)	Fridtjof Nansen-class frigate	Off Norway, heading south, 10 kt	Hull sonar. No helicopter
RFA Tidespring (A 136)	Tide-class tanker	South of Shetland, 8 kt	Fuel and support
HUNTER 1, HUNTER 2	RAF Poseidon MRA.1 (P-8A)	Lossiemouth	Radar, sonobuoys, torpedoes (held). Flying hours counted
NORNE 1, NORNE 2	RNoAF P-8A Poseidon	Evenes	Radar, sonobuoys, torpedoes (held). Flying hours counted

Norway's helicopters are not available: the NH90s have been withdrawn and *Thor Heyerdahl* sails without one. There is one submarine, HMS *Anson*; no Norwegian submarine takes part.

4.2 Allies and partners

— **Norwegian Joint Headquarters (NJHQ), Reitan.** Oslo's eye on the operation, and on Langeled above all.

— **Commander Submarines (CTF 311), Northwood.** Keeps the waterspace for HMS *Anson*.

— **HM Coastguard and the National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC).** The AIS picture, the fishing fleet, the merchant traffic. They will tell you where *Yantar* stops.

— **Gassco, Haugesund, and the SHEFA-2 operator.** The operators of the lines. Their sensors on the pipelines and the cable can pick up noise near them.

— **NATO MARCOM, Northwood.** Wants the picture, and will share it with the Alliance.

4.3 The Russians, as known at 1800Z

CONTACT	CLASS / ROLE	POSITION 1800Z	CONFIDENCE	BASIS
Yantar	GUGI oceanographic research ship (Pr.22010). ROVs, survey sonars	60°54'N 001°00'E	CONFIRMED	AIS on; held by the Coastguard and on radar
An Akula	Nuclear attack submarine (Pr.971)	Not held	PROBABLE	Norwegian arrays, yesterday, Norwegian Sea, south-west bound

CONTACT	CLASS / ROLE	POSITION 1800Z	CONFIDENCE	BASIS
A GUGI carrier	Delta IV Stretch conversion, BS-64 *Podmoskovye* class	Not held	POSSIBLE	Believed sailed from Olenya Guba. Source not shared
Her submersible	Nuclear deep-diving submersible, carried by the above	Not held	POSSIBLE	Assumed with the carrier

Nothing Russian is held below the surface this evening. That is a statement about what we hold, not about what is there.

4.4 How they behave

They listen. The Russians hear us as we hear them. A frigate close to them, a helicopter dipping over them, buoys splashing into the water round them, active sonar pinging: they notice. When they suspect they are being watched they change their pattern: the submersible breaks off, the work moves on, the next attempt comes later. When they are sure, they may give up and leave. Being heard by them is not always a failure: being seen is what London wants them to feel, in the end. But a group that leaves before you have proved anything takes its secret with it.

***Yantar* harasses.** Last November her crew aimed lasers at the pilots of an RAF P-8 at night, and ships that came close found their satellite navigation jammed. Expect both.

Nobody fires. The Russians are under orders not to start anything, and so are we.

4.5 What they are likely to do

MOST LIKELY COURSE OF ACTION

The carrier comes in quietly from deep water to one of the three corridors, stands off and sends her submersible to work, in several sessions, while the Akula draws attention and *Yantar* plays her part on the surface. When the task is done, the group leaves to the north, and Moscow calls it routine research.

MOST DANGEROUS COURSE OF ACTION

The task is done on a line we were not watching, with nothing held and nothing proved. Or one of our ships or aircraft gives Moscow an incident: a dazzled pilot, a frigate too close to *Yantar*, a weapon that leaves a rail. **Both begin with something we did, or did not do.**

5 Constraints

5.1 Rules of engagement

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1   Peacetime. Weapons tight in all domains.
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In practice: nothing Russian is hostile, and nothing is engaged. The Russian submarines are in international waters and are entitled to be there.

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2   Surface and subsurface weapons on hold.
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In practice: no torpedo goes into the water, not even in self-defence. A submarine is hunted to be found, held and shown that she has been found, never to be attacked. The order is set at side, unit and mission level and re-asserted throughout the operation; weapon release is set to none for every torpedo we carry.

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3   Britain and Norway do not fire first.
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In practice: any weapon of ours that leaves a ship or an aircraft is the incident Moscow is waiting for, and the Russian group turns hostile. A laser or a jammer is not an attack; do not answer it as one.

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4   Active sonar is allowed.
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In practice: it is not a weapon, and you may use it. But it is heard much further than it hears, and the Russians hear it first.


5.2 Around *Yantar*

You will want to watch *Yantar*, and you may. Two rules keep it from becoming an incident.

Ships: stay outside a mile. A ship of ours that closes her to about a mile is warned; one that closes to half a mile, by her own movement, gives Moscow a "dangerous manoeuvre" to protest about, and London pays for it. A frigate within some miles of her may find her satellite navigation jammed: a nuisance to report, nothing more.

Aircraft at night: stay out of the beam. In the dark, her crew aims lasers at aircraft that come low and close. A crew that is painted is warned, and the warning says how far and how high to go; a crew that stays inside risks a pilot injured and the aircraft sent home. Height or distance is enough. In daylight the lasers are not used, and an aircraft's camera can record what she is doing.

FIGURE 3 — AROUND *YANTAR*



Left: the two distances that matter for a ship. Right: at night, the zone low and close to her where aircraft get painted; climbing or opening the range is enough to stay out of it.

5.3 Flying hours

— **RAF.** HUNTER 1 and 2 have **30 flying hours between them** for the whole operation.

— **Royal Norwegian Air Force.** NORNE 1 and 2 have **16 hours between them**, or fewer if NATO is stretched after October; the opening message gives the figure.

— **How they are counted.** Every minute an aircraft is airborne, from take-off to landing, transit included. You are warned when a fleet runs low. When its hours are spent its aircraft are ordered home and stay on the ground, and whatever they were watching is no longer watched.

— **The ships do not run out.** *St Albans*' towed array, HMS *Anson* and MERLIN 21 (weather permitting) work for the whole operation. They are slow to move across a sea this size.

FIGURE 4 — WHAT A P-8 HOUR BUYS, FROM EACH BASE



The same sortie length from both bases. The Norwegian hours are fewer and more of each one is spent in transit: they are best kept for the Norwegian side of the area, and for when they count.

This is the heart of the operation: the same hours must find a group that could be on any of three corridors, hold it once it is found, and still cover the second night. Hours spent over an empty corridor are not refunded.

5.4 Weather

Plan for the gale (section 3.3). When it sets in, recover MERLIN 21 before the height of it: a deck landing in that sea is dangerous, and a helicopter lost to the weather is lost all the same. Until it eases she stays on deck, and the whole underwater picture gets worse, except for a towed array at low speed.

5.5 Langeled and Oslo

Oslo expects the pipeline off its coast to be watched, whatever the evidence says. If hours go by with no ship of ours and no aircraft near any of the LANGELED reference points, the Norwegian Ministry of Defence will ask why, and the partnership suffers. A frigate on station, or an aircraft passing, is enough to answer it.

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6 What London expects, and how to play it

6.1 Find, hold, prove, then decide

London and Oslo want four things from CTG 327.4, in this order.

— **Find** the Russian submarines. The Akula will probably be the first; she is not the one that matters most.

— **Hold** them on your picture, for as long as you can. Every hour a Russian submarine is held is an hour the Russians cannot be sure they are alone.

— **Prove** what they are doing on our infrastructure. A contact shows that the group is here; it does not show what it is doing. Proof is the submersible held while she works on a line: the longer, and the more sensors that see it, the stronger. The carrier held beside the line while her submersible works, or a daylight photograph of *Yantar* at her work, adds to it.

— **Decide** when London tells Moscow, in public, “we see you” (section 7). That is the end the whole operation works towards, and it is one decision, taken once.

Nobody fires. A group that leaves because it knows it has been seen, and before its task is done, is a success: deterrence without a shot. A group that finishes its work unseen is not.

6.2 London's first question

At **0600Z on 13 November** London takes stock for the morning: what have you found, and what do you hold? There is nothing to send. London looks at your picture as it is at that moment. An empty picture after the first night is noticed.

The operation ends at **1800Z on 14 November**. If the Russian group leaves earlier, Northwood says so, and the operation closes some hours later, with the debrief.

6.3 No missions in the box

This scenario is played the classic way. **The release build contains no missions at all**: only your units and the reference points on the map. Nothing is searching when you start the clock. You build your own anti-submarine missions, choose where they go, and move them when the picture changes. Everything is played with units, sensors and missions; the scenario reads what your side actually holds on its picture, whatever the classification of the contact.

6.4 Setting up an ASW patrol in Command

— **The area.** Mark the corners of the box you want searched with reference points of your own (the corridor reference points are a good skeleton), select them, and in the Mission Editor create a **Patrol** mission of type **ASW Patrol** from the selected points. A prosecution zone round it lets units follow a contact a little way out of the box.

— **The units.** Assign the P-8s, the frigates or MERLIN 21 to it. One mission per corridor is a simple start; one mission can hold both a ship and an aircraft.

— **The one-third rule.** With it on, Command keeps part of the assigned aircraft on the ground as a relief; with it off, everything assigned launches. With two aircraft per fleet and counted hours, decide which you want before you press start.

— **Speed and height.** In the mission, set a low station speed for ships, so that the towed array and the hull sonar can hear; set the P-8s' station altitude low enough to lay and monitor buoys.

— **Doctrine and EMCON.** Check the dipping-sonar and sonobuoy settings in the doctrine, and keep active sonar off in EMCON until you choose to use it. Do not change the weapon settings: they are held on purpose and re-asserted.

— **HMS *Anson*.** Give her a small patrol box of her own, or move her by hand: a few knots, deep, and not too often.

FIGURE 5 — WHO CAN HEAR WHAT



Bars show, roughly, how far each sensor can expect to hold each target in passive listening, in a moderate sea.
A gale shortens everything except the towed array at low speed. Active sonar reaches further, and the Russians hear it first.

Qualitative only. The noisy Akula is heard far off by almost everything; the large carrier takes a good sensor at a fair range; the small submersible is heard only close in, which usually means HMS *Anson*, a dipping sonar or buoys laid over the line itself.

6.5 Practical advice

— **Tow slowly.** *St Albans*' towed array is your best surface ear, and it hears best at low speed. Sprinting deafens it; a frigate that crosses the area at speed hears nothing on the way.

— **Passive first.** Lay passive DIFAR buoys and listen before anything else. Active buoys, active sonar and a dipping sonar find things close in, and tell the Russians that someone is looking.

— **Place HMS *Anson*, then leave her.** She is the sensor most likely to hold the carrier and the submersible, and she is slow to move quietly. Put her where the evidence points and let her listen; do not chase the Akula with her.

— **Count the P-8 hours.** They run from take-off to landing, transit included, and a patrol mission keeps aircraft airborne for as long as it can. Launch with a purpose, recall when the purpose is done, and **keep one crew for the night:** the second night may be when it matters.

— **MERLIN 21 is for close work.** The dipping sonar is the best tool against the submersible, but only close in, and a helicopter hovering low over a submarine is loud for the Russians as well as for us. Use it to confirm, not to search.

— **Mind *Yantar*.** At night keep aircraft away from her by range or height, and keep every ship more than a mile from her (section 5.2).

— **Watch Langeled for Oslo.** A ship or a passing aircraft near the Norwegian corridor keeps Oslo content (section 5.5); *Thor Heyerdahl* is already there.

— **Plan for the gale.** It is forecast for the second day. Have the towed array where it matters before it arrives, recover MERLIN 21 in time, and do not count on buoys at the height of it.

— **Mind your footprint.** Ships close in, dipping and buoys close to them are heard. Hold from as far as your sensors allow.

TRAINING BUILD

A separate file, **We-See-You, 2026 - Training.scen**, is the same scenario with anti-submarine patrol missions already set up and assigned (a barrier in the Faroe–Shetland Channel, patrols over SHEFA-2, FLAGS and Langeled, and a box for HMS *Anson*) and with tips that appear during play. Open the Mission Editor to see how they are built, then move them where you think the Russians are. It is recommended for a first game. The Russians behave exactly as in the release file, but it hands nothing on to the campaign. Its missions keep the P-8s in the air: watch the flying hours.

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7 Special actions guide

7.1 How they work

Command cannot ask Northwood a question or put words in a minister's mouth. Those acts are special actions, in the **Special Actions** menu, and in this scenario there are only **two**. Everything else is done with your units. Each run is one order, given now and recorded with its time. Answers come back as messages. When an action cannot be carried out, the message says why: too soon since the last time, already done. Neither acts on a selected unit, and neither can be undone.

The game's messages refer to this section. The names below are exactly as they appear in the game. For each: what it is for, what it needs, and what it risks.

7.2 Intelligence

`Intel - Evidence summary`

Northwood's analysts state where things stand: for each of the three corridors, NO INDICATION, WEAK, MODERATE or STRONG; what the submersible has been seen doing, if she has been seen at work long enough to say; how long each Russian submarine has been held so far; what evidence London can use; whether the Russians seem to know they are being watched; the P-8 hours left to each fleet; and whether London has already gone public. **For:** knowing where the investigation stands before you commit aircraft, move HMS *Anson* or ask London to speak; and not losing count of your hours or of how loud you have been. **Needs:** patience. The answer comes after a delay, and the analysts cannot be asked too often: a request made too soon after the last one is turned down, with the time of the next. **Risks:** none in itself, and the Russians do not hear it. But it never says which corridor is true, and a WEAK can rest on a lead that later proves false. Summaries are kept for the debrief.

7.3 London

London - Go public: We see you

The Secretary of State tells Moscow, in public, that Britain and Norway see its submarines over their cables and pipelines. **For:** the end the operation works towards. Said with proof behind it, it wins support at home and among the allies, and it tells the Russians, in front of everyone, that their task is no longer secret. **Needs:** to be run **twice**: the first run only *selects*, and London's message states the evidence the Secretary of State would speak with; the second run of the same action *confirms* it. A selection that is never confirmed is never said. It can be said **once per game**. Nothing stops you saying it without evidence, but London can only show what you have proved. **Risks:** without evidence Moscow denies, mocks and wins the argument, and London loses face at home and with Oslo. With or without evidence, **the Russians will know they have been seen**: they may change their pattern or break off and leave, which may be exactly what you want, or may come before you can prove what they were doing.

SELECT, THEN CONFIRM, ONCE

"Go public" is the one irreversible political decision of the operation. The first run costs nothing and tells you what London would say with the evidence of the moment. Read that message before you run the action a second time. Once confirmed, it cannot be said again, nor taken back.

7.4 What the two do not do

Neither action finds a submarine, moves a unit or changes the weather. The summary reports; it does not investigate. The statement deters; it does not prove. The work of the operation is done by the towed array, the buoys, the dipping sonar and HMS *Anson*, in the missions you build.

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8 The governments and the press

London measures three things it will not show you as figures: Britain's **international legitimacy**, **public opinion** at home, and **UK–Norway cohesion**. You will see them move through events. The BBC wants to know whether a Russian submarine is being tracked right now; *The Times* asks what the Navy can show; the House of Commons asks the same question less politely. Oslo and Equinor ask about Langeled, and the gas markets twitch when nobody seems to be watching it. NATO MARCOM wants the picture. The Shetland council in Lerwick and the Faroese government in Tórshavn want to know whether their cable is safe. Moscow speaks of routine research; TASS accuses Britain of hysteria; the Kremlin warns London against provocations.

No answer is needed. Each event is judged on what your ships and aircraft are doing when it is weighed: a submarine held, evidence gathered, Langeled watched, or, for Moscow and TASS, a quiet sea with no incident round *Yantar* and no pilot dazzled. What you do at sea moves the three far more than anything said in London.

THE LINE YOU DO NOT CROSS

If any of the three falls too far, the government withdraws its support and the operation ends there. Downing Street will warn you twice before it happens. Take the warning.

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9 Provenance

Everything before this section is written as though it were real. This section takes the mask off.

9.1 The facts the scenario is built on

DATE	FACT (PUBLIC SOURCES)	WHAT IT CONTRIBUTES HERE
Nov 2025	***Yantar*** **north of Scotland and towards the Faroes; lasers aimed at RAF P-8 pilots; GPS jammed around HMS *Somerset*, which shadowed her for eight days**	The research ship, her lasers and the jamming
Dec 2025	**UK–Norway agreement on joint naval patrols**	Operation DEEP WATER and the combined task group
Mar–Apr 2026	**An Akula and two GUGI submarines from Olenya Guba, with *Yantar*, spend more than a month over critical infrastructure in the North Atlantic; met by an RAF P-8 (450+ flying hours), Merlins, HMS *St Albans*, RFA *Tidespring*, a Norwegian P-8 and frigate, and sonobuoys**	The Russian group, your task group and the flying hours
9 Apr 2026	**Defence Secretary John Healey makes it public: "we see your activity over our cables and our pipelines"**	The title, and the decision to go public
Spring 2026	**A GUGI operation near Svalbard rehearsing the laying of a device on cables, foiled by the UK, Norway and the US (made public 10 Sep 2026)**	Why a submersible on a line is taken seriously
In service	**SHEFA-2 (Faroe – Shetland – Scotland), FLAGS and Vesterled (to St Fergus), Langeled (Nyhamna – Sleipner – Easington)**	The three corridors

9.2 What is real and what is invented

— **Real:** the units and their types, the bases, the cable and the pipelines, GUGI and its submarines, *Yantar* and her behaviour in 2025 and 2026, and the UK–Norway agreement. Their presence and actions on these dates are a projection.

— **Invented:** the return of the group in November 2026 and the meeting of *Yantar*, an Akula and a GUGI carrier in one window; the GUGI's task; Operation DEEP WATER, Task Group 327.4 and OPORD 26-052; every intelligence product, event, message and quotation; the incidents; the fishing boats and merchant ships named in the game. In the game *Yantar* and the Russian submarines are represented by the closest types the database carries.

9.3 Sources

Royal Navy and USNI News (*Yantar*, November 2025); *Breaking Defense*, ITV and Al Jazeera (the March–April 2026 operation); Euronews and ITV (the Defence Secretary's statement; the UK–Norway

agreement); *Defense News* and Euronews (GUGI near Svalbard); Langeled pipeline; Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research (GUGI).

10 Glossary

AIS Automatic Identification System: the name, position and track a ship broadcasts about herself.

Akula Russian nuclear attack submarine (Project 971).

Astute British nuclear attack submarine; HMS *Anson* is the fifth of the class.

DIFAR Directional passive sonobuoy: it listens and gives a bearing, and makes no noise.

Dipping sonar A sonar lowered into the sea from a hovering helicopter.

EMCON Emission control: which sensors a unit may switch on.

FLAGS Far North Liquids and Associated Gas System, from Brent to St Fergus.

GNSS Satellite navigation (GPS and the like).

GUGI Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research of the Russian Ministry of Defence.

NJHQ Norwegian Joint Headquarters, Reitan, near Bodø.

NMIC National Maritime Information Centre, the British maritime picture.

P-8 Boeing P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft (Poseidon MRA.1 in the RAF).

Towed array A long line of hydrophones towed far behind a ship, away from her own noise.

UKMCC United Kingdom Maritime Component Commander, Northwood: the originator of your orders.

We See You, 2026 — Deep Water, fourth scenario of the *Europe 2026* campaign for Command: Modern Operations. Designer: totobimbo. Written from inside CTG 327.4's picture at 1800Z: what the commander believes, not what is true. Intelligence, events and quotations are invented; units, bases, the cable, the pipelines and *Yantar* are real, their actions on these dates a projection. Coastlines: Natural Earth 1:10 m.